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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 354 (CIA/RR IM-354)

WORLD PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE US AND THE USSR

15 June 1951

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### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 354 (CIA/RR IM-354)

# WORLD PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE US AND THE USSR

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Note:

. It contains information available to CIA as of 15 May 1951.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction  a. Varieties  b. Principal Applications  c. Substitutes  2. World Production and Reserves  a. Production of All Types  b. Reserves of All Types  c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds  3. Marketing  a. Cartel Control  b. Processing and Distribution  4. World Consumption by Countries  5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes  a. Controls during World War II  b. Stockpiling  c. Preclusive Buying	Sui	nmary
a. Varieties b. Principal Applications c. Substitutes 2. World Production and Reserves a. Production of All Types b. Reserves of All Types c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds 3. Marketing a. Cartel Control b. Processing and Distribution 4. World Consumption by Countries 5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes a. Controls during World War II b. Stockpiling		
b. Principal Applications c. Substitutes 2. World Production and Reserves a. Production of All Types b. Reserves of All Types c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds 3. Marketing a. Cartel Control b. Processing and Distribution 4. World Consumption by Countries 5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes a. Controls during World War II b. Stockpiling	1.	a Varieties
c. Substitutes  2. World Production and Reserves  a. Production of All Types  b. Reserves of All Types  c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds  3. Marketing  a. Cartel Control  b. Processing and Distribution  4. World Consumption by Countries  5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes  a. Controls during World War II  b. Stockpiling		b. Principal Applications
<ol> <li>World Production and Reserves</li> <li>a. Production of All Types</li> <li>b. Reserves of All Types</li> <li>c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds</li> <li>Marketing</li> <li>a. Cartel Control</li> <li>b. Processing and Distribution</li> <li>World Consumption by Countries</li> <li>Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes</li> <li>a. Controls during World War II</li> <li>b. Stockpiling</li> </ol>		c. Substitutes
a. Production of All Types b. Reserves of All Types c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds 3. Marketing a. Cartel Control b. Processing and Distribution 4. World Consumption by Countries 5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes a. Controls during World War II b. Stockpiling	2.	World Production and Reserves
b. Reserves of All Types  c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds  3. Marketing  a. Cartel Control  b. Processing and Distribution  4. World Consumption by Countries  5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes  a. Controls during World War II  b. Stockpiling		a. Production of All Types
c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds		h Dogoryog of All Tymes
a. Cartel Control  b. Processing and Distribution  4. World Consumption by Countries  5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes  a. Controls during World War II  b. Stockpiling		c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds
b. Processing and Distribution	3.	Marketing
<ul> <li>4. World Consumption by Countries</li></ul>		a. Cartel Control
5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes		b. Processing and Distribution
a. Controls during World War IIb. Stockpiling	4.	World Consumption by Countries
b. Stockpiling	5.	Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes
b. Stockpiling		a. Controls during World War II
c. Predusive Buying		
d Drobable Effects on the Soviet Bloc		





Appendix.	Tables	13
	Table 1. World Production of Rough Diamonds (Gem and Industrial), 1937 and 1942-50	13
	Table 2. Estimated World Production of Industrial Diamonds, 1937 and 1942-50	
	Table 3. Declared Exports of Industrial Diamonds from Belgium and the Netherlands to the Soviet Bloc, 1947-50	15
	Table 4. Declared Exports of Industrial Diamonds to Switzerland from Belgium and the Netherlands, 1947-50	16
	Table 5. Total Estimated Exports of Industrial Diamonds to the Soviet Bloc, 1949-50	16



# WORLD PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE US AND THE USSR

### Summary

Industrial diamonds have become increasingly essential to mass production in modern industry. The small size and light weight of diamonds are out of all proportion to their importance but also make it very difficult to control their shipment. The greatest demand for diamonds began during World War II in the manufacture of war material and has continued unabated. Since the principal source is limited largely to areas in Africa, far removed from the US and the USSR, industrial diamonds are of particular strategic importance to both countries. Annual US requirements are between  $4\frac{1}{2}$  and 5 million carats, 1 or about one-half of the total world output. The UK and Canada are the next largest consumers. The needs of the Soviet Bloc are relatively small -- between 225,000 and 300,000 carats, of which the USSR consumes about two-thirds. Only a small part of the US stockpile objectives had been secured as of 1 January 1951. The present Soviet stockpile would probably last a year.

The US, because of its highly mechanized industry, would be particularly affected by any interruption in the supply of industrial diamonds. Although there is some hope of reducing the need for diamond crushing bort by a substitute process, the industrial diamond requirements of modern industry are expected to continue essentially the same.

The production and sale of industrial diamonds are largely controlled by the West, but the location of most of the African diamond-producing areas makes them strategically vulnerable in case of war.

<sup>1.</sup> The carat is the unit by which most gems are weighed. The international metric carat (CM) is equivalent to 0.2 gram, or 3.086 grains (155.54 carats being equivalent to a troy ounce).





#### 1. Introduction.

Diamonds, because of their hardness, which is greater than that of any other natural or artificial substance, are the most important gem stones used in modern industry, and they have become essential in the development of precision machinery. Without diamond abrasive wheels and other diamond tools, the mass production of machine tools and precision instruments would be impossible.

The small size and light weight of diamonds are out of all proportion to their importance but also make it very difficult to control their shipment. For example, the total world output of all types of diamonds in 1950 weighed only slightly more than 3 short tons. A quarter of a million carats of industrial stones thus weigh about 125 pounds. The weight limit in the diplomatic pouch is usually about 100 pounds, and therefore the quantity of diamonds that could be shipped by diplomatic pouch assumes considerable importance.

#### a. Varieties.

All types of diamonds, including gem-grade, may be classified as industrial. However, there are three general kinds of industrial diamonds: bort, industrial stones, and waste from the cutting and polishing of gem stones. Bort is a trade name for flawed, off-color, or broken fragments of diamonds unsuitable for gems. This material is fragmented to specific grain sizes and is marketed as crushing bort. Industrial stones include off-color, colorless, and some imperfect stones unsuitable for gems; carbonadoes, or black diamonds, a very hard and extremely tough aggregate of very small diamond crystals; and ballas, a very hard and tough globular mass of diamond crystals radiating from a common center.

### b. Principal Applications.

Industrial diamonds are classified by use as tool stones, die stones, crushing bort, and diamond powder. Tool stones include industrial diamonds used in drill bits utilized by the mining, petroleum, and heavy construction industries; in boring and turning tools, where the diamond is mounted on a suitable tool and used to produce finishes of one-thousandth-of-an-inch tolerance; and in dressing and truing tools, in which the diamond is used to true other types of abrasive wheels and to give a high finish to automotive and aircraft parts. Die stones, or diamond wire-drawing dies, are pierced sound stones of



1/4 to 3/4 carat which are used to draw wire uniformly to extremely fine sizes. Crushing bort, which is graded to size and embedded or bonded with metal or resins, is utilized in making diamond drill bits and diamond abrasive wheels. The latter are used to sharpen drilling tools and to true other types of abrasive wheels. Diamond powder is fragmented bort crushed to micron sizes and is used to finish carbide dies, jewel bearings, glass lenses, and other glass products and to provide a high and rapid finish on many mechanical products.

### c. Substitutes.

Much time and work have been spent in efforts to make diamonds synthetically or to find a satisfactory substitute for industrial diamonds. Until recently, however, little hope of success has been obtained. Boron carbide and silicon carbide powder have been substituted for diamond powder in some uses, and boron carbide molded into dies has been utilized in wire-drawing where tolerance requirements are not too rigid. Tests by the US Byreau of Mines on the substitution of tungsten carbide drill bits for diamond bits have shown that, without resharpening, four tungsten carbide bits are required to drill the same footage obtained with one diamond drill bit. Recently, however, the Soviets have discovered an electro-mechanical method for sharpening cutting tools which does not require the use of diamond abrasive wheels or diamond powder. Experimental work in the US with the Soviet process lass confirmed its feasibility and has resulted in some advancements and technical improvements in the method.

The utilization of this electro-mechanical method of tool-sharpening should reduce both the cost of sharpening tools and the quantity of industrial diamonds required by industry. This last factor is of particular importance to the US, as it is entirely dependent on imports for its supplies of industrial diamonds. Crushing bort, the

<sup>1.</sup> The Soviet process employs direct current and a special electrolyte. The tool to be ground and the grinding wheel, a copper disk, are connected in a direct-current circuit so that the tool forms the anode and the grinding wheel the cathode. By the action of the direct current in the electrolyte, a film of insoluble compounds is formed on the anode (the tool), protecting it from further electrolytic action. Removal of this film by the cathode (the rotating grinding wheel) exposes a fresh surface of the metal to the action of the electrolyte and thus assures the continuous removal of metal from the anode. The equipment required to set up this process is relatively cheap, and a high degree of skill is not required to operate it.



bulk of which is used in the manufacture of abrasive wheels now employed to sharpen tools, makes up 81 percent of the US stockpile objective of industrial diamonds. If the major use for bort could be eliminated or drastically reduced, large sums of money could be saved and US dependence on an overseas source could be avoided.

### 2. World Production and Reserves.

With a few minor exceptions, reasonably accurate statistics are now available for total world production of diamonds of all types. Accurate figures for world reserves of diamonds, however, are not available.

### a. Production of All Types.

Diamonds have been found in all continents, but commercial production at present is confined largely to Africa, with South America and Asia providing the remainder. Africa accounts for about 97 percent of the annual world output; South America, 2 to  $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent; and Asia,  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 percent. South American and Indian mines have not been explored and developed on the same scale as in Africa, and production comes entirely from placer deposits. Various diamond fields produce stones of different quality, and the percentage of fine stones per mine also varies. Only a small part of the annual world production is suitable for cutting into fine gems of I carat or more (about 200,000 cut stones out of a total of 14 million carats produced). About one-quarter of the total is off-color gem material, and the remainder, or 60 to 75 percent, is suitable only for industrial purposes. (The annual output of all types of diamonds by countries in 1937 and in the 1942-50 period is given in Table 1, Appendix.) Definite information on the production of diamonds in the USSR is negligible, but the annual output is very small. The only known deposits are in the gold and platinum mining areas west of the Urals in the Chkalov district and in the Kama Valley near Cherdin, which contain a few diamonds, and in the placer mines on the east slope of the Middle Urals near Neoganskoi, Sverdlovsk, and Troitsk.

### b. Reserves of All Types.

The known reserves of all types of diamonds are not very large and at the present rate of consumption are believed to be sufficient for





about 30 to 40 years. The African fields contain the major known reserves of diamonds. India is the oldest known diamond field but, like Borneo, is largely worked out. Brazil, British Guiana, and Venezuela produce from placer deposits alone and are regarded as minor sources.

The underground mines in South Africa (known as pipe mines) I normally have reserves plotted from 3 to 5 years ahead, and the large mines undoubtedly have reserves for several years, but, as they get deeper, the pipes decrease in size, as does the average diamond content. Many of the South African alluvial fields have been exhausted. The fields in South-West Africa, the Congo, and the Gold Coast have reserves blocked out for about 10 to 12 years in the future and are believed to have reserves for 20 years' additional operations. In Tanganyika, only one diamond pipe has been discovered, and operations to date have been limited to the area surrounding the pipe. However, estimates of the quantity of diamonds both in the surrounding area and in the pipe itself are not available. Mining in French Equatorial Africa until recently has been on a small scale and only now is being mechanized.

# c. Production and Reserves of Industrial Diamonds.

Before 1937 the quantity of diamonds used industrially was relatively small, and interest in the annual output was comparatively slight. Therefore, no breakdown of the world production of diamonds showing the quantity of industrial diamonds mined was published. At the beginning of World War II, large supplies of bort had been accumulated because of lack of a market. The war brought on industrial demands for mineral raw materials, machine tools, and precision instruments that provided an outlet for the surplus bort and for larger quantities of diamond tools and die stones. This wartime demand has continued unabated. (For an estimate of the annual production of industrial diamonds, see Table 2, Appendix.)

<sup>1.</sup> So-called from the pipelike form of the vertical cylindrical masses of igneous rock in which diamonds are found.





Industrial diamonds make up about 60 to 85 percent of the total annual production of diamonds by weight and account for about 25 percent of the total value. Total figures for the production of diamonds in the Belgian Congo are broken down to show the quantities of gem and industrial stones recovered. However, figures for other producing countries show only the total quantity of diamonds produced and a rough percentage estimate of the part of the total output that may be industrial.

### (1) Production Trends.

The annual world production of industrial diamonds for the 1942-50 period averaged about 8,470,000 carats (see Table 2, Appendix). Output reached a peak of 11,181,800 carats in 1945 and then declined to a low of 6,774,800 carats in 1947. Since 1948 the trend has been upward, showing a sharp increase in 1949. The output in 1951, it is believed, will be slightly higher than in 1950. The increased output is expected to come largely from the mines in the Belgian Congo, with smaller contributions from French Equatorial Africa and the Gold Coast. The mines in the Belgian Congo, which account for about 86 percent of the total annual output of industrial diamonds, are being mechanized, and a systematic program for development and mechanization is also being introduced at the diamond fields in French Equatorial Africa.

### (2) Reserves.

Bort is a by-product of all diamond mining except in the Belgian Congo, where industrial diamonds make up more than 90 percent of the output. Reserves of industrial diamonds, therefore, are included in the total diamond reserves. Exact figures on industrial diamonds, most of which come from the large gravel deposits of the Belgian Congo, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Angola, are not available, but it is believed that reserves of this type in the known diamond deposits will be adequate for about 40 years at the 1950 rate of consumption.



### 3. Marketing.

As already stated, the principal diamond deposits, both gem and industrial, are found in Africa. The production and sale of the African output of gem and industrial diamonds, with the exception of French Equatorial Africa, is controlled by a cartel.

### a. Cartel Control.

The diamond cartel, which is variously referred to as the "Diamond Corporation" or "The Syndicate," has its headquarters in London and is made up of the following companies, all of which are British: The De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited; its subsidiary, the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South-West Africa, Limited, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, the South-West Finance Corporation, Limited. These organizations own all the shares of the Diamond Corporation, Limited, which has contracts for the purchase of the diamond production from the Belgian Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Gold Coast, and Tanganyika, all of which, with the exception of the Belgian Congo, are under British control. The cartel also controls the sale of rough diamonds of gem and industrial grade. The Diamond Trading Company, Limited, is the sales agent for gem stones, and Industrial Distributors (1946), Limited, is the sales agent for industrial diamonds.

French Equatorial Africa is the only potentially large source of diamonds in Africa which is outside the control of the cartel. The diamond mining industry in this area is controlled by the International Mining Company, the East Ubangi Mining Company, and the Diamond Prospecting and Exploitation Company, an affiliate of the East Ubangi Mining Company. The International Mining Company also controls the Ogooni-Lobaze Mining Company, which engages in both gold and diamond mining.

### b. Processing and Distribution.

The run-of-mine diamond production controlled by the Diamond Corporation is shipped from Africa to London for classification into industrial- or gem-grade material. Then all material classified as bort is shipped back from London to Johannesburg, South Africa, for





fragmentation. This step, a comparatively recent one, was started in 1946. During World War II, some dealers purchased bort, sorted the material, "peeled" some of the larger stones to obtain gem-grade diamonds, and sold them at a much higher price. In order to stop this leak of gem-grade material, the Diamond Corporation instituted the practice of fragmenting the bort before sale. The fragmented bort (crushing bort) is then returned to London for marketing.

Industrial diamonds, like gem-grade material, are sold by series and purchased by lot number from samples shown by Industrial Distributors (1946), Limited. The opportunity to purchase industrial diamonds is made available only a few times each year, and the quantity that may be purchased by one country during a calendar year is limited. There are no direct sales of gem or industrial diamonds by the Diamond Corporation to the Soviet Bloc.

### 4. World Consumption by Countries.

Diamonds are one of several mineral commodities of which the major consuming countries are not the producers. By far the largest consumer is the US, followed by the UK and Canada. Statistics on the annual consumption, however, are not available.

US industry requires  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to 5 million carats of industrial diamonds annually, or about half the total world output. These requirements, however, are not filled, and consumption is about 3 to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million carats, about 75 to 80 percent of which is crushing bort. About 70 to 80 percent of the crushing bort consumed is utilized in the manufacture of abrasive wheels. Annual consumption by the UK is believed to be about 1 to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million carats, and that by Canada about  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 million carats.

Information on the postwar consumption of industrial diamonds by the USSR can be expressed only in terms of the available supply of imported stones. This supply is obtained largely from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and through black-market and smuggling activities. (Declared exports by Belgium and the Netherlands to Soviet Bloc countries for the 1947-50 period are shown in Table 3, Appendix.) Swiss imports of industrial diamonds from Belgium in 1949 increased through each quarter and for the year amounted to 15 percent of the total exports from Belgium, as compared with 0.09 percent in 1948, and 1.3 percent in 1947. In 1950, however, Swiss imports of industrial





diamonds from Belgium decreased to 9.6 percent of the total exports from that country. It has been reported by reliable sources that up to 95 percent of the Swiss imports were for transshipment to the Soviet Bloc. (Declared exports from Belgium and the Netherlands to Switzerland for the 1947-50 period are shown in Table 4, Appendix.) The reduction in direct exports of industrial diamonds from Belgium and the Netherlands to Switzerland in 1950 is attributed to the withdrawal of open licenses for export of this material to Switzerland. An exporter of industrial diamonds to Switzerland must now apply for an individual license.

The USSR also purchases industrial diamonds directly through the Soviet Legations in many of the diamond-producing or processing countries. Purchases by a Legation are regarded as local transactions, and export licenses are not required. Thus these sales do not appear in export statistics.

It is reported that Czechoslovakia purchased 2,800 carats of industrial diamonds from Brazil in May 1950 and 53,485 carats of diamonds of all types from French Equatorial Africa in the first 5 months of that year. Although a breakdown showing the type of diamonds received in the latter shipment is not available, it seems probable, in view of their relatively low dollar value, that most were of industrial grade.

Most of the industrial diamonds imported by Germany are from Belgium and totaled 40 carats in 1948, 2,389.18 carats in 1949, and 71,389.18 carats in 1950. Although Belgian export statistics do not differentiate between East Germany and West Germany, the major portion probably was utilized in the Soviet Zone, as there are few industries in West Germany that use industrial diamonds. It is assumed that the Zeiss wire-drawing plant at Jena, reported to require 6,000 carats of die stones per month, has been the principal ultimate consumer of imports from Belgium.

It is estimated that about 422,400 carats of industrial diamonds were exported to the Soviet Bloc in 1949 and about 242,000 carats in 1950 (see Table 5, Appendix). The apparent reduction in imports by the Soviet Bloc in 1950, however, is not real and reflects rather the increased amount of black-marketing, smuggling, and direct shipments by diplomatic pouch. The total annual supply of industrial diamonds



available to the Soviet Bloc is estimated to be from 400,000 to 450,000 carats. Annual consumption by the USSR is estimated to be from 150,000 to 200,000 carats, and by the European Satellites from 75,000 to 100,000 carats, or a total of from 225,000 to 300,000 carats for the Soviet Bloc. The remainder of the supply, about 100,000 to 150,000 carats, is believed to be stockpiled.

## 5. Possibilities of Control for Strategic Purposes.

In the event of war the output and marketing of industrial diamonds would obviously rest with the West, as the UK, Belgium, and France control the production of diamonds in Africa, and the Diamond Corporation, with headquarters in London, controls the sale of the majority of them. However, because of the location of most of the African diamond-producing areas, they would be strategically vulnerable. At present, the greatest danger is labor unrest resulting from Communist infiltration of labor organizations in the Gold Coast, French West Africa, and Sierra Leone.

### a. Controls during World War II.

The Diamond Corporation retained almost complete control of the diamond industry in the World War II period, only the method of distribution being altered for some countries. The USSR obtained most of its industrial diamond supplies from the Corporation in London or through trade agreements with Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany and its satellites obtained their supplies largely from collaborators in Belgium and the Netherlands and from stocks confiscated when the Germans overran those countries. Smaller quantities were obtained from South America through smuggling and black-market operations.

Distribution and control of imported industrial diamonds in the US in 1940 and up to December 1941 were effected through the British Ministry of Supply, which notified the British Consulate in New York of the quantity and type of diamonds that it had available for shipment each month. By collaboration between the Consulate and the War Production Board, a distribution list was forwarded to London authorizing the shipment of specific quantities to designated companies in the US. General Import Order M 63 of 28 December 1941 placed all





imported industrial diamonds under Government control. On 27 March 1942, War Production Board Conservation Order M 109 provided for quarterly reports of inventories and sales and reports of transfers and imports of rough diamonds both unset and in tools not in use. Authorization for all transactions was subject to approval of the War Production Board. On 4 February 1944, Order M 109 was revised, and all consumers and titleholders of less than 250 carats were excluded from reporting. Authorization was not required for sales or transfers of crushing bort in amounts less than 100 carats or of rough diamonds totalling less than 25 carats. Order M 109 was revoked on 14 December 1945.

### b. Stockpiling.

Stockpiling of industrial diamonds is feasible and relatively simple. Diamonds do not deteriorate, and the only requirement is a safe place for storage. The difficulty so far in building up a stockpile is, for the most part, a shortage of mined stones. As of 1 January 1951, only 37 percent (4,070,047 carats) of the US stockpile objective for industrial stones and 19 percent (9,481,415 carats) for crushing bort had been obtained.

### c. Preclusive Buying.

Cartel control of the industrial diamond industry should present an ideal means to prevent the sale of diamonds to a potential aggressor nation. However, any attempt to set up a preclusive buying contract under which the present cartel, the Diamond Corporation, would restrict its sales to countries not trading with the Soviet Bloc is believed to have little chance of success. Through the cartel program, the mining companies are guaranteed a fixed gross income per year which in turn is reflected in the well-being of the people and the stability of the local governments. Diamonds in European and African countries represent not only a profitable industry but also, at least in some of them, a hedge against inflation.

## d. Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc.

A drastic reduction in shipments of industrial diamonds to the Soviet Bloc would reduce greatly the efficiency of the fabricated metal





industry in that area, because the Bloc countries are almost entirely dependent on imports for their supply of industrial diamonds. The USSR is developing a large metal-production and machine-manufacturing program as a part of its long-range plan to increase industrial capacity for peacetime as well as for armament requirements. Thus Soviet demands for metal-cutting tools, wire-drawing dies, and other precision instruments are large. The supplies now available are believed to beadequate for peacetime operations, but in case of war the USSR would be faced with the difficult problem of maintaining even the present level of imports. At the present rate of consumption the Soviet stocks, estimated at 100,000 to 150,000 carats, would last only a year. The USSR would therefore probably be required -- at least in the initial stages of a war -- to ration the available supply, which would result in an immediate shortage in that country and the rest of the Soviet Bloc. Although the electro-mechanical method of sharpening tools pioneered by the USSR should reduce somewhat the quantities of industrial diamonds required, no reduction in efforts to obtain them is apparent, and requirements are expected to continue essentially the same. Without sufficient industrial diamonds, mass production methods in the industries of the Bloc countries would be severely hampered.

TABLES

Table 1

World Production of Rough Diamonds (Gem and Industrial) 1937 and 1942-508/

Metric Carata	1950	538;866 9,699,597 123,500 <u>b</u> 126,346 140,000 195,000 <u>b</u> 504,603 70,597 1,731,510 260,000 37,462 56,500b 3,000b	14,086,981
Me	1949	769,981 122,928 122,928 132,530 191,119 280,134 191,787 1,254,022 250,000 34,790 56,392 3,000	13,634,647
	1948	795,509 5,824,567 118,800 77,970 850,000 850,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,500,000 36,301 75,513	XQ 046,538
	1947	799, 210 107, 469 62, 310 852, 493 605, 554 179, 554 1, 204, 734 275, 000 24, 669 61, 634 3, 500	9,742,432
	1946	806,961 6,033,452 87,381 51,834 830,000 559,229 163,611 119,446 11,281,787 325,000 30,958 20,912 1,600	10,312,171
	1945	803,887 82,800 82,849 79,802 812,451 504,309 115,668 111,666 11,141,242 15,400 15,400 15,400 15,400 15,400 15,400	14,384,046
3	1944	799,120 60,000 69,726 1,165,858 608,744 154,379 90,667 93,682 301,000 13,911 <u>C</u> 22,037	11,764,489
	1943	794, 990 4, 881, 639 56, 183 36, 193 1, 317, 798 834, 492 94, 427 52, 998 275, 000 18, 272 22, 846 6, 804	8,693,971
	1942	794, 853 6,018, 23,6 16,345 1,055, 735. 1,046, 187 56, 187 118, 821 300,000 22, 207 34,048 6,788	9,589,833
	1937	626, h2h 1, 925, 228 57, 687 1, 577, 661 913, 401 196, 803 3, 234 1, 030, 434 238, 606 35, 958 6,000	9,617,024
	Country	Angola Belgian Congo Fr. Equat. Africa Fr. West Africa Gold CoastC Slerra Leone South-West Africa Tanganyika Union of S. Africa Bratilb British Gulena Yenezuela	Total

Statistics from Bureau of Mines Minerals Tearbook. Istimated.

Exports. Not available. Partly estimated and includes India, Borneo, Australia, and the USSR.



Estimated World Production of Industrial Diamonds  $\mathbb{B}^{J}$  1937 and 1942-50

Percent of Total Out- put Reported as Industrial Diamonds 40 40 250,66 92 4,531,00 67.5 1,183,00 75 5 86 5 9,86 60 143,00 40 143,00 40 140 140 151 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 16	Metric Carata 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950	316,600 318,000 320, 5,537,000 4,492,000 6,931,	31,000 37,900 40,500 55,900 58,900 72,200 80,100 82,900 40,300 37,900 51,000 52,900	791,800 988,000 874,300 609,300 622,500 639,300 637,500 323,400	627,700 500,700 365,200 302,500 355,500 363,300 279,300 269,500	2,800 $4,700$ $7,700$ $7,600$ $8,100$ $8,900$ $10,000$ $14,000$	10,000 13,200 22,600 26,900 29,800 23,000 37,000 47,900	5,900 15,100 $16,600$ 57,000 $61,000$ $60,200$ $60,000$ $62,700$	180,000 165,000 180,000 165,000 195,000 165,000 150,000 150,000	8,800 7,300 5,500 6,100 $8,900$ 9,800 14,500 13,900	9,100 8,800 5,100 8,300 24,600 30,200 22,500	30 7,567,500 6,581,700 8,861,400 11,181,800 7,271,800 6,774,800 7,041,000 10,474,945 10,439,300
250,600 1,531,000 1,183,000 1,183,000 548,000 9,800 51,500 143,000 143,000 144,000 14,400	1943	318,000 h, 492,000	37,900	988,000	500, 700	η <b>,</b> 700	13,200	15,100	165,000	7,300	9,100	6,581,700
	1937										آ آ	

E. The figures shown are based on the percentage figure reported by the producing countries. The quantity and quality of diamonds produced annually, like other mineral raw materials, vary from year to year, and thus the percentage figures given in the first column of the table may vary about 5 percent.
 Not available.
 Actual figure reported by the Belgian Congo.





Pable 3

Declared Exports of Industrial Diamonds from Belgium and the Netherlands to the Soviet Bloc 1947-50

-				•	Metric Carata
Belgium to:	1947	1948	1949	1950	Total
Czechoslovakia Poland	2,839.35	1,360.00	4,508.00 0	9,104,00 0	17,811.35
Rumenia Hungary	00	00	7,117.53	18.50	7,136,03
USSK	0	()·qq/•/	99,150,50	59.19	106,936,54
Total	2,985,42	9,317.50	111,148,13	9,161,69	132,612,74
Netherlands to:					
Czechoslovakia	9,110,00	51,631.00	η6, 700, 00	32,000,00	139,441.00
Folund	00.487	0 0	00.000.00	1,600,00	12,284,00
Tugoslavia	2,322.00	16,809.00	0	0	19,131,00
Germany (Sowlet Zone) USSR	00	0 24.883.00	10,000,00	00	10,000,00
	•			•	00.00
Total	12,216,00	93,323,00	175,800,00	35,500,00	316,839.00
Grand Total	15, 201, 42	102,640.50	286,948.13	<sub>1</sub> ,661.69	449,451,74

#### SECTOT

Table 4

Declared Exports of Industrial Diamonds to Switz er land from Belgium and the Netherlands

			Me	tric Carats
Country	1947	1948	1949	1950
Belgium Netherlands	7,358.71 614.00	958.00 3,276.00	155,697.06 10,000.00a/	108,775.00 3,000.00 a/
Total	7,972.71	4,234.80	165,697.06	111,775.00
	<del></del>		fra marin is	

a/ Partly estimated.

Table 5

Total Estimated Exports of Industrial Diamonds to the Soviet Bloc 1949-50

	<u> </u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		200	Metrić Carats
4	·	••		1949	1950
Exports from Belgiu	m and tl	ne Nether	lands	•	
to the USSR	e j			286,948.13	89,420.00
80 Percent of Import	s by Sw	itzerland		131, 837.64	87,019.00
Imports by Hungary	:	A Property of the Control of the Con		1,465.00	
90 Percent of Import	s from	Belgium	by		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Germany a/				2,150.26	64,199.35
Total		\$ \$ \$ \$		422,401.03	242,138.35

a/ Belgian export figures do not differentiate between East Germany and West Germany, but it is estimated that 90 percent of Belgian exports to Germany go eventually to East Germany.